



United States Strategic Approach to The People's Republic of China 美国对中华人民共和国的战略方针

Introduction

介绍

Since the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) established diplomatic relations in 1979, United States policy toward the PRC was largely premised on a hope that deepening engagement would spur fundamental economic and political opening in the PRC and lead to its emergence as a constructive and responsible global stakeholder, with a more open society. More than 40 years later, it has become evident that this approach underestimated the will of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to constrain the scope of economic and political reform in China. Over the past two decades, reforms have slowed, stalled, or reversed. The PRC's rapid economic development and increased engagement with the world did not lead to convergence with the citizen-centric, free and open order as the United States had hoped. The CCP has chosen instead to exploit the free and open rules based order and attempt to reshape the international system in its favor. Beijing openly acknowledges that it seeks to transform the international order to align with CCP interests and ideology. The CCP's expanding use of economic, political, and military power to compel acquiescence from nation states harms vital American interests and undermines the sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the world.

自 1979 年美国 and 中华人民共和国建立外交关系以来，美国的对华政策在很大程度上是基于这样一种，即通过深化接触刺激中华人民共和国的经济和政治开放，使其成为一个有建设性的、负责任的全球利益相关者，并建立一个更加开放的社会。40 多年后的今天，这种做法显然低估了中国共产党（中共）制约中国经济和政治改革范围的意愿。在过去的 20 年里，改革的步伐已经放缓、停滞甚至倒退。中华人民共和国经济的快速发展和与世界接触的增多并没有像美国所希望的那样，与以公民为中心的自由开放秩序相接轨。相反，中共选择了利用自由开放的规则秩序，试图重塑有利于自己的国际体系。北京公开承认其试图改造国际秩序并使之符合中共的利益和意识形态。中共不断扩大利用经济、政治和军事力量迫使民族国家默许，损害了美国的重大利益，损害了世界各国和人民的主权和尊严。

To respond to Beijing's challenge, the Administration has adopted a competitive approach to the PRC, based on a clear-eyed assessment of the CCP's intentions and actions, a reappraisal of the United States' many strategic advantages and shortfalls, and a tolerance of greater bilateral friction. Our approach is not premised on determining a particular end state for China. Rather, our goal is to protect United States vital national interests, as articulated in the four pillars of the 2017 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS). We aim to: (1) protect the American

people, homeland, and way of life; (2) promote American prosperity; (3) preserve peace through strength; and (4) advance American influence.

为了应对北京的挑战，美国政府对中华人民共和国采取了一种竞争性的方式，其基础是对中共的意图和行动的清晰评估，对美国的许多战略优势和不足的重新评估，以及对更大双边摩擦的容忍。我们的做法并不是以确定中国的某一个特定的最终状态为前提。相反，我们的目标是保护美国的重要国家利益，正如 2017 年美国国家安全战略（NSS）的四大支柱所阐述的那样。我们的目标是：(1)保护美国人民、家园和生活方式；(2)促进美国的繁荣；(3)通过实力维护和平；(4)提升美国的影响力。

Our competitive approach to the PRC has two objectives: first, to improve the resiliency of our institutions, alliances, and partnerships to prevail against the challenges the PRC presents; and second, to compel Beijing to cease or reduce actions harmful to the United States' vital, national interests and those of our allies and partners. Even as we compete with the PRC, we welcome cooperation where our interests align. Competition need not lead to confrontation or conflict. The United States has a deep and abiding respect for the Chinese people and enjoys longstanding ties to the country. We do not seek to contain China's development, nor do we wish to disengage from the Chinese people. The United States expects to engage in fair competition with the PRC, whereby both of our nations, businesses, and individuals can enjoy security and prosperity.

我们对中华人民共和国采取的竞争性方式有两个目标：第一，提高我们的机构、联盟和伙伴关系的应变能力，以应对中华人民共和国提出的挑战；第二，迫使北京停止或减少有损于美国以及我们的盟国和伙伴的重要国家利益的行动。即使在我们与中华人民共和国竞争的同时，我们也欢迎在我们的利益一致的方面进行合作。竞争不一定会导致对抗或冲突，美国对中国人民有着深厚而持久的尊重，与中国有着长期的联系。我们不谋求遏制中国的发展，也不希望脱离中国人民。美国期望与中华人民共和国进行公平竞争，使我们的国家、企业和个人都能享有安全和繁荣。

Prevailing in strategic competition with the PRC requires cooperative engagement with multiple stakeholders, and the Administration is committed to building partnerships to protect our shared interests and values. Vital partners of this Administration include the Congress, state and local governments, the private sector, civil society, and academia. The Congress has been speaking out through hearings, statements, and reports that shed light on the CCP's malign behavior. The Congress also provides legal authorities and resources for the United States Government to take the actions to achieve our strategic objectives. The Administration also recognizes the steps allies and partners have taken to develop more clear-eyed and robust approaches toward the PRC, including the European Union's publication in March 2019 of *EU-China: A Strategic Outlook*, among others.

要在与中华人民共和国的战略竞争中取胜，需要与多个利益相关方合作，政府致力于建立伙伴关系，保护我们的共同利益和价值观。本届政府的重要合作伙伴包括国会、州和地方政府、私营部门、民间社会和学术界。国会一直在通过听证会、声明和报告来揭露中共的恶行。国会还为美国政府提供了法律授权和资源以便美国政府采取行动来实现我们

的战略目标。美国政府还肯定了盟友和伙伴们为制定更清晰、更有力的针对中华人民共和国方针而采取的措施，包括欧盟在 2019 年 3 月出版的《欧盟-中国：战略展望》（EU-China: a Strategic Outlook）等。

The United States is also building cooperative partnerships and developing positive alternatives with foreign allies, partners, and international organizations to support the shared principles of a free and open order. Specific to the Indo-Pacific region, many of these initiatives are described in documents such as the Department of Defense June 2019 *IndoPacific Strategy Report* and the Department of State November 2019 report on *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision*. The United States is working in concert with mutually aligned visions and approaches such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nation's *Outlook on the Indo-Pacific*, Japan's free and open Indo-Pacific vision, India's Security and Growth for All in the Region policy, Australia's Indo-Pacific concept, the Republic of Korea's New Southern Policy, and Taiwan's New Southbound Policy.

美国还在与外国盟友、伙伴和国际组织建立合作伙伴关系，发展积极的替代方案，以支持自由开放秩序的共同原则。具体到印太地区，其中许多举措在美国国防部 2019 年 6 月的《印太战略报告》和美国国务院 2019 年 11 月的《自由开放的印太战略报告-推进共同愿景》等文件中都有介绍。美国正在与东南亚国家联盟的印太展望、日本的自由开放的印太愿景、印度的区域安全与增长政策、澳大利亚的印太概念、韩国的新南方政策、台湾的"新南向政策"等相互一致的愿景和做法进行合作。

This report does not attempt to detail the comprehensive range of actions and policy initiatives the Administration is carrying out across the globe as part of our strategic competition. Rather, this report focuses on the implementation of the NSS as it applies most directly to the PRC.

本报告并不试图详细介绍政府作为战略竞争的一部分，在全球范围内开展的全面行动和政策措施。相反，本报告将重点介绍美国国家安全战略的实施情况，因为它最直接适用于中华人民共和国。

Challenges 挑战

The PRC today poses numerous challenges to United States national interests. 今天的中华人民共和国对美国的国家利益构成了诸多挑战。

1. Economic Challenges 1. 经济挑战

Beijing's poor record of following through on economic reform commitments and its extensive use of state-driven protectionist policies and practices harm United States companies and workers,

distort global markets, violate international norms, and pollute the environment. When the PRC acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Beijing agreed to embrace the WTO's open market-oriented approach and embed these principles in its trading system and institutions. WTO members expected China to continue on its path of economic reform and transform itself into a market-oriented economy and trade regime.

北京在履行经济改革承诺方面的不良记录以及广泛采用国家主导的保护主义政策和做法，损害了美国公司和工人的利益，扭曲了全球市场，违反了国际准则，并污染了环境。中华人民共和国在 2001 年加入世界贸易组织（WTO）时，中国政府同意接受 WTO 的开放市场导向方针，并将这些原则纳入其贸易体系和机构中。世贸组织成员希望中国继续走经济改革的道路，向市场化的经济体制和贸易体制转型。

These hopes were not realized. Beijing did not internalize the norms and practices of competition-based trade and investment, and instead exploited the benefits of WTO membership to become the world's largest exporter, while systematically protecting its domestic markets. Beijing's economic policies have led to massive industrial overcapacity that distorts global prices and allows China to expand global market share at the expense of competitors operating without the unfair advantages that Beijing provides to its firms. The PRC retains its non-market economic structure and state-led, mercantilist approach to trade and investment. Political reforms have likewise atrophied and gone into reverse, and distinctions between the government and the party are eroding. General Secretary Xi's decision to remove presidential term limits, effectively extending his tenure indefinitely, epitomized these trends.

这些希望并没有实现。北京没有将基于竞争的贸易和投资的规范和做法内部化，而是利用加入世贸组织的好处，成为世界上最大的出口国，同时有计划地保护其国内市场。北京的经济政策导致了大规模的工业产能过剩，扭曲了全球价格，使中国能够以牺牲那些没有北京为其提供的不公平的优势的竞争对手的利益为代价扩大全球市场份额。中华人民共和国保留了非市场经济结构和国家主导的重商主义贸易和投资方式。政治改革也一直在萎缩和倒退，政府和党的区别正在被侵蚀。习总书记关于取消总统任期限制的决定实际上是无限期地延长了其总统任期，而这只是这些趋势的一个缩影。

In his 2018 *Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974*, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) determined that numerous acts, policies, and practices of the PRC government were unreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict United States commerce. Based on a rigorous investigation, USTR found that the PRC: (1) requires or pressures United States companies to transfer their technology to Chinese entities; (2) places substantial restrictions on United States companies' ability to license their technology on market terms; (3) directs and unfairly facilitates acquisition of United States companies and assets by domestic firms to obtain cutting edge technologies; and (4) conducts and supports unauthorized cyber intrusions into United States companies' networks to access sensitive information and trade secrets.

美国贸易代表（USTR）在其 2018 年对中国根据 1974 年《贸易法》第 301 条对中国有关技术转让、知识产权和创新的行为、政策和做法的调查结论中，认定中华人民共和国政府的许多行为、政策和做法是不合理的或歧视性的，给美国的商业带来了负担或限制。根据严格的调查，USTR 发现，中华人民共和国：(1)要求或迫使美国公司向中国实体转让其技术；(2)对美国公司按市场条件许可其技术的能力施加实质性的限制；(3)指导和不公平地协助国内公司收购美国公司和资产，以获得尖端技术；(4)对美国公司的网络进行和支持未经授权的网络入侵，以获取敏感信息和商业机密。

The list of Beijing's commitments to cease its predatory economic practices is littered with broken and empty promises. In 2015, Beijing promised that it would stop government directed cyber-enabled theft of trade secrets for commercial gain, reiterating that same promise in 2017 and 2018. Later in 2018, the United States and a dozen other countries attributed global computer intrusion campaigns, targeting intellectual property and confidential business information, to operators affiliated with the PRC's Ministry of State Security – a contravention of Beijing's 2015 commitment. Since the 1980s, Beijing has signed multiple international agreements to protect intellectual property. Despite this, more than 63 percent of the world's counterfeits originate in China, inflicting hundreds of billions of dollars of damage on legitimate businesses around the world.

在北京停止掠夺性经济行为的承诺清单上，充斥着许多背弃和空洞的承诺。2015 年，北京承诺将停止由政府主导的网络窃取商业秘密以获取商业利益的行为，2017 年和 2018 年又重申了同样的承诺。2018 年晚些时候，美国和其他十几个国家将针对知识产权和商业机密信息的全球计算机入侵活动归咎于与中华人民共和国国家安全部有关联的运营商，这违反了北京 2015 年的承诺。自上世纪 80 年代以来，北京已经签署了多项保护知识产权的国际协议。尽管如此，世界上 63% 以上的假货来自于中国，给世界各地的合法企业造成了数千亿美元的损失。

While Beijing acknowledges that China is now a “mature economy,” the PRC continues to argue in its dealings with international bodies, including the WTO, that it is still a “developing country.” Despite being the top importer of high technology products and ranking second only to the United States in terms of gross domestic product, defense spending, and outward investment, China self-designates as a developing country to justify policies and practices that systematically distort multiple sectors globally, harming the United States and other countries.

即便北京承认中国现在是一个“成熟的经济体”，但在与包括世贸组织在内的国际机构打交道时，中华人民共和国仍旧称其是一个“发展中国家”。尽管中国是高技术产品的第一大进口国，在国内生产总值、国防开支、对外投资等方面仅次于美国，但中国自称为发展中国家的政策和做法在全球范围内系统性地扭曲了多个领域，损害了美国和其他国家的利益。

One Belt One Road (OBOR) is Beijing's umbrella term to describe a variety of initiatives, many of which appear designed to reshape international norms, standards, and networks to advance

Beijing's global interests and vision, while also serving China's domestic economic requirements. Through OBOR and other initiatives, the PRC is expanding the use of Chinese industrial standards in key technology sectors, part of an effort to strengthen its own companies' position in the global marketplace at the expense of non-Chinese firms. Projects that Beijing has labeled OBOR include: transportation, information and communications technology and energy infrastructure; industrial parks; media collaboration; science and technology exchanges; programs on culture and religion; and even military and security cooperation. Beijing is also seeking to arbitrate OBOR-related commercial disputes through its own specialized courts, which answer to the CCP. The United States welcomes contributions by China to sustainable, high-quality development that accords with international best practices, but OBOR projects frequently operate well outside of these standards and are characterized by poor quality, corruption, environmental degradation, a lack of public oversight or community involvement, opaque loans, and contracts generating or exacerbating governance and fiscal problems in host nations.

"一带一路"（OBOR）是北京用来描述其各种措施的总称，其中许多措施似乎是为了重塑国际规范、标准和网络，以促进中国政府的全球利益和愿景，同时也为中国国内经济需求而服务。通过一带一路和其他举措，中华人民共和国正在扩大中国工业标准在关键技术领域的使用范围，这也是以牺牲非中国企业的利益为代价，加强中国企业在全球市场上的地位。北京标榜的一带一路项目包括：交通、信息通信技术和能源基础设施；工业园区；媒体合作；科技交流；文化和宗教项目；甚至军事和安全合作。北京也在寻求通过自己的特定的法院以仲裁与一带一路相关的商业纠纷，而这些法院由中共所领导。美国欢迎中国在符合国际最佳实践的情况下，对可持续、高质量发展的做出贡献，但一带一路项目的运作往往远远超出了这些标准，其特点是质量差、腐败、环境恶化、缺乏公共监督或社区参与、贷款不透明、合同产生或加剧了东道国的治理和财政问题。

Given Beijing's increasing use of economic leverage to extract political concessions from or exact retribution against other countries, the United States judges that Beijing will attempt to convert OBOR projects into undue political influence and military access. Beijing uses a combination of threat and inducement to pressure governments, elites, corporations, think tanks, and others – often in an opaque manner – to toe the CCP line and censor free expression. Beijing has restricted trade and tourism with Australia, Canada, South Korea, Japan, Norway, the Philippines, and others, and has detained Canadian citizens, in an effort to interfere in these countries' internal political and judicial processes. After the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia in 2016, the PRC government imposed new tariffs on land-locked Mongolia's mineral exports passing through China, temporarily paralyzing Mongolia's economy.

鉴于北京越来越多地利用经济杠杆从其他国家获取政治让步或对其他国家实施报复，美国判断，北京将试图将一带一路项目转化为不正当的政治影响和军事准入。北京利用威胁和利诱相结合的方式，向政府、精英、企业、智库等施压——往往是以不透明的方式——迫使他们站在中共的立场上，审查自由言论。北京限制了与澳大利亚、加拿大、韩国、日本、挪威、菲律宾等国的贸易和旅游，并拘留了加拿大公民，试图干涉这些国家的内部

政治和司法程序。2016 年达赖喇嘛访问蒙古国后，中华人民共和国政府对途经中国的内陆的蒙古国矿产出口征收新的关税，使蒙古国经济暂时瘫痪。

Beijing seeks global recognition for its environmental efforts and claims to promote “green development.” China, however, has been the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter by a wide margin for more than a decade. Beijing has put forward vague and unenforceable emissions reduction commitments that allow China’s emissions to keep growing until “around 2030.” China’s planned growing emissions will outweigh the reductions from the rest of the world combined. Chinese firms also export polluting coal-fired power plants to developing countries by the hundreds. The PRC is also the world’s largest source of marine plastic pollution, discharging over 3.5 million metric tons into the ocean each year. The PRC ranks first in the world for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in coastal nations’ waters around the world, threatening local economies and harming the marine environment. Chinese leaders’ unwillingness to rein in these globally harmful practices does not match their rhetorical promises of environmental stewardship.

北京寻求全球认可，声称要推动 “绿色发展” 然而，中国十多年来一直是世界上最大的温室气体排放国。北京提出了模糊的、无法执行的减排承诺，让中国的排放量持续增长，直到 “2030 年左右”。中国计划中的排放量的增长将超过世界其他国家的减排量。中国企业向发展中国家出口的污染性燃煤电厂也数以百计。中华人民共和国也是世界上最大的海洋塑料污染源，每年向海洋排放超过 350 万吨。中华人民共和国在全球沿海国家的海域非法、未报告和无管制的捕捞活动居世界首位，威胁了当地的经济，损害了海洋环境。中国领导人不愿遏制这些对全球有害的做法，与他们对环境管理的口头承诺并不相符。

2. Challenges to Our Values

2. 我们的价值观所面临的挑战

The CCP promotes globally a value proposition that challenges the bedrock American belief in the unalienable right of every person to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under the current generation of leadership, the CCP has accelerated its efforts to portray its governance system as functioning better than those of what it refers to as “developed, western countries.” Beijing is clear that it sees itself as engaged in an ideological competition with the West. In 2013, General Secretary Xi called on the CCP to prepare for a “long-term period of cooperation and conflict” between two competing systems and declared that “capitalism is bound to die out and socialism is bound to win.”

中共在全球范围内倡导一种价值主张，挑战了美国人对每个人享有生命、自由和追求幸福的不可剥夺的权利这一基本信念。在这一代领导层的领导下，中共加快了将其治理体系描绘成比它所说的 “西方发达国家 ”的治理体系运作得更好的努力。北京很清楚，它认为自己正在与西方国家进行意识形态的竞争。2013 年，习总书记呼吁中共准备在两种相互竞争的制度之间 “长期合作与冲突”，并宣称 “资本主义必亡，社会主义必胜”。

The CCP aims to make China a “global leader in terms of comprehensive national power and international influence,” as General Secretary Xi expressed in 2017, by strengthening what it refers to as “the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” This system is rooted in Beijing’s interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology and combines a nationalistic, single-party dictatorship; a state-directed economy; deployment of science and technology in the service of the state; and the subordination of individual rights to serve CCP ends. This runs counter to principles shared by the United States and many likeminded countries of representative government, free enterprise, and the inherent dignity and worth of every individual.

习总书记在 2017 年曾表示，中共的目标是通过加强所谓的 “中国特色社会主义制度”，使中国成为 “综合国力和国际影响力的全球领导者”。这一制度植根于北京对马克思列宁主义意识形态的解释，并将民族主义的一党专政、国家主导的经济、为国家服务的科学和技术部署以及个人权利服从于中共的目的结合在一起。这违背了美国 and 许多志同道合的国家共同的代议制政府、自由企业和每个人的固有尊严和价值等原则。

Internationally, the CCP promotes General Secretary Xi’s vision for global governance under the banner of “building a community of common destiny for mankind.” Beijing’s efforts to compel ideological conformity at home, however, present an unsettling picture of what a CCP-led “community” looks like in practice: (1) an anticorruption campaign that has purged political opposition; (2) unjust prosecutions of bloggers, activists, and lawyers; (3) algorithmically determined arrests of ethnic and religious minorities; (4) stringent controls over and censorship of information, media, universities, businesses, and non-governmental organizations; (5) surveillance and social credit scoring of citizens, corporations, and organizations; and (6) and arbitrary detention, torture, and abuse of people perceived to be dissidents. In a stark example of domestic conformity, local officials publicized a book burning event at a community library to demonstrate their ideological alignment to “Xi Jinping Thought.”

在国际上，中共在 “构建人类命运共同体 ”的旗帜下，宣传习总书记的全球治理观。然而，北京在国内强迫意识形态的一致性的努力，却呈现出了中共领导的 “共同体 ”在实践中的令人不安的景象。(1)反腐运动肃清了政治反对派；(2)对博主、活动家和律师进行不公正的起诉；(3)对少数民族和宗教少数群体进行算法决定的逮捕；(4)对信息、媒体、大学、企业 and 非政府组织进行严格的控制和审查；(5)对公民、企业 and 组织进行监视和社会信用评分；(6)任意拘留、酷刑和虐待被认为是异见者的人。在国内的一个赤裸裸的例子中，地方官员将发生在社区图书馆的焚书事件公之于众，以表明他们在意识形态上与 “习近平思想 ”保持一致。

One disastrous outgrowth of such an approach to governance is Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, where since 2017, authorities have detained more than a million Uighurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in indoctrination camps, where many endure forced labor, ideological indoctrination, and physical and psychological abuse. Outside these camps, the regime has instituted a police state employing emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and biogenetics to monitor ethnic minorities’ activities to ensure allegiance to the CCP. Widespread religious persecution – of Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Muslims, and members of Falun Gong –

includes the demolition and desecration of places of worship, arrests of peaceful believers, forced renunciations of faith, and prohibitions on raising children in traditions of faith.

这种治理方式所造成的灾难性后果之一就是北京在新疆的政策，自 2017 年以来，当局将一百多万维吾尔族和其他少数民族及宗教团体成员关押在再教育营中，许多人在那里忍受着强迫劳动、意识形态灌输和身心虐待。在这些集中营外，政权建立了一个警察国家，利用人工智能和生物遗传学等新兴技术来监控少数民族的活动，以确保他们效忠于中共。对基督教徒、藏传佛教徒、穆斯林和法轮功成员的广泛宗教迫害，包括拆毁和亵渎礼拜场所、逮捕和平信徒、强迫放弃信仰、禁止按信仰传统养育子女等。

The CCP's campaign to compel ideological conformity does not stop at China's borders. In recent years, Beijing has intervened in sovereign nations' internal affairs to engineer consent for its policies. PRC authorities have attempted to extend CCP influence over discourse and behavior around the world, with recent examples including companies and sports teams in the United States and the United Kingdom and politicians in Australia and Europe. PRC actors are exporting the tools of the CCP's techno-authoritarian model to countries around the world, enabling authoritarian states to exert control over their citizens and surveil opposition, training foreign partners in propaganda and censorship techniques, and using bulk data collection to shape public sentiment.

中共的强制意识形态认同运动并没有止步于中国的边界。近年来，北京一直在干涉主权国家的内政，并为其政策谋求认同。中华人民共和国权力机构试图扩大中共对世界各国的话语和行为的影响，最近的例子包括美国和英国的公司和运动队以及澳大利亚和欧洲的政客。中华人民共和国的行为人们正在向世界各国输出中共技术专制模式的工具，使专制国家能够控制其公民和监视反对派，对其外国伙伴进行宣传和审查技术的培训，并利用大量的数据收集来塑造公众情绪。

China's party-state controls the world's most heavily resourced set of propaganda tools. Beijing communicates its narrative through state-run television, print, radio, and online organizations whose presence is proliferating in the United States and around the world. The CCP often conceals its investments in foreign media entities. In 2015, China Radio International was revealed to control 33 radio stations in 14 countries via shell entities, and to subsidize multiple intermediaries through providing free, pro-Beijing content.

中国的政党国家控制着世界上资源最丰富的宣传工具。北京通过国营的电视、印刷品、广播和网络组织来传播其言论，而这些组织在美国和世界各地的影响力正在不断扩大。中共经常隐瞒其对外国媒体公司的投资。2015 年，中国国际广播电台被曝出通过空壳公司控制了 14 个国家的 33 家电台，并通过提供免费的、亲北京的内容来补贴多家中介机构。

Beyond the media, the CCP uses a range of actors to advance its interests in the United States and other open democracies. CCP United Front organizations and agents target businesses, universities,

think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and Federal officials in the United States and around the world, attempting to influence discourse and restrict external influence inside the PRC.

在媒体之外，中共利用一系列人员在美国和其他开放的民主国家推进其利益。中共统战组织和代理人以美国和世界各地的企业、大学、智库、学者、记者、地方、州和联邦官员为目标，试图影响美国和世界各地的言论，限制中共内部的外来影响。

Beijing regularly attempts to compel or persuade Chinese nationals and others to undertake a range of malign behaviors that threaten United States national and economic security, and undermine academic freedom and the integrity of the United States research and development enterprise. These behaviors include misappropriation of technology and intellectual property, failure to appropriately disclose relationships with foreign government sponsored entities, breaches of contract and confidentiality, and manipulation of processes for fair and merit-based allocation of Federal research and development funding. Beijing also attempts to compel Chinese nationals to report on and threaten fellow Chinese students, protest against events that run counter to Beijing's political narrative, and otherwise restrict the academic freedom that is the hallmark and strength of the American education system.

北京经常试图强迫或说服中国人和其他人做出一系列威胁美国国家和经济安全、破坏美国研究和发展机构学术自由与真实的恶性行为。这些行为包括盗用技术和知识产权，不当披露与外国政府资助的实体的关系，违反合同和保密规定，操纵联邦研发经费的公平和择优分配程序。北京还试图强迫中国人报告和威胁其中国同学，抗议与北京的政治叙事背道而驰的事件，并以其他方式限制作为美国教育体系标志和优势的学术自由。

PRC media entities, journalists, academics, and diplomats are free to operate in the United States, but Beijing denies reciprocal access to American counterpart institutions and officials. The PRC government routinely denies United States officials, including the United States Ambassador to the PRC, access to Department of State-funded American Cultural Centers, which are hosted in Chinese universities to share American culture with the Chinese people. Foreign reporters working in the PRC often face harassment and intimidation.

中华人民共和国的媒体、记者、学者和外交官可以在美国自由活动，但北京拒绝与美国的对口机构和官员进行对等的接触。中华人民共和国政府经常拒绝美国官员，包括美国驻中华人民共和国大使在内的美国官员进入美国国务院资助的美国文化中心，这些中心设在中国的大学里，旨在与中国人民分享美国文化。在中华人民共和国工作的外国记者经常面临骚扰和恐吓。

3. Security Challenges

3. 安全方面的挑战

As China has grown in strength, so has the willingness and capacity of the CCP to employ intimidation and coercion in its attempts to eliminate perceived threats to its interests and advance its strategic objectives globally. Beijing's actions belie Chinese leaders' proclamations that they

oppose the threat or use of force, do not intervene in other countries' internal affairs, or are committed to resolving disputes through peaceful dialogue. Beijing contradicts its rhetoric and flouts its commitments to its neighbors by engaging in provocative and coercive military and paramilitary activities in the Yellow Sea, the East and South China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and Sino-Indian border areas.

随着中国实力的增强，中共在试图消除其利益受到的威胁和在全球范围内推进其战略目标时，使用恐吓和胁迫的意愿和能力也在增强。北京的行动违背了中国领导人所宣称他们反对威胁或使用武力，不干涉他国内政，或致力于通过和平对话解决争端的言论。北京违背其言辞，藐视对邻国的承诺，在黄海、东海和南海、台湾海峡、中印边境地区进行挑衅性、胁迫性的军事和准军事活动。

In May 2019, the Department of Defense issued its annual report to the Congress, *Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC*, assessing current and future trajectories of China's military-technological development, security and military strategies, and People's Liberation Army (PLA) organizational and operational concepts. In July 2019, the PRC Minister of Defense publicly acknowledged that OBOR is linked to the PRC's aspirational expansion of PLA presence overseas, including locations such as the Pacific Islands and the Caribbean.

2019年5月，美国国防部向国会发布了《涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全动态》年度报告，评估了中国当前及未来的军事技术、安全和军事战略的发展轨迹以及中国人民解放军的组织 and 作战理念。2019年7月，中华人民共和国国防部长公开承认，一带一路与中华人民共和国渴望中国人民解放军在海外的扩张有关，包括太平洋岛屿和加勒比海等地区。

Beijing's military buildup threatens United States and allied national security interests and poses complex challenges for global commerce and supply chains. Beijing's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy gives the PLA unfettered access into civil entities developing and acquiring advanced technologies, including state-owned and private firms, universities, and research programs. Through non-transparent MCF linkages, United States and other foreign companies are unwittingly feeding dual-use technologies into PRC military research and development programs, strengthening the CCP's coercive ability to suppress domestic opposition and threaten foreign countries, including United States allies and partners.

北京的军事建设威胁到美国和盟国的国家安全利益，对全球商业和供应链构成了复杂的挑战。北京的军民融合战略使解放军不受限制地进入开发和获取先进技术的民间实体，包括国有和私营企业、大学和研究项目。通过不透明的军民融合战略的联系，美国和其他外国公司在不知不觉中向中华人民共和国的军事研发项目提供两用技术，加强了中共压制国内反对派和威胁外国，包括美国的盟友和伙伴的能力。

The PRC's attempts to dominate the global information and communications technology industry through unfair practices is reflected in discriminatory regulations like the PRC National Cyber Security Law, which requires companies to comply with Chinese data localization measures that enable CCP access to foreign data. Other PRC laws compel companies like Huawei and ZTE to

cooperate with Chinese security services, even when they do business abroad, creating security vulnerabilities for foreign countries and enterprises utilizing Chinese vendors' equipment and services.

中华人民共和国试图通过不公平的做法主导全球信息和通信技术产业，这体现在了《中华人民共和国国家网络安全法》等歧视性法规中，该法要求公司必须遵守中国的数据本地化措施，使中共能够获取外国数据。中华人民共和国的其他法律迫使华为和中兴这样的公司必须与中国的安全服务机构合作，即使它们在国外开展业务，也会给外国和使用中国供应商设备和服务的企业制造安全漏洞。

Beijing refuses to honor its commitment to provide travel documents for Chinese citizens with orders of removal from the United States in a timely and consistent manner, effectively blocking their removals from our country and creating security risks for American communities. In addition, the PRC's violations of our bilateral consular treaty puts United States citizens at risk in China, with many Americans detrimentally affected by the PRC government's coercive exit bans and wrongful detentions.

北京拒绝履行承诺，及时、一致地提供持有美国驱逐令的中国公民的旅行证件，有效地阻止了他们被遣送出境，给美国社会造成了安全隐患。此外，中华人民共和国违反我国的双边领事条约，使美国公民在中国面临风险，许多美国人因中华人民共和国政府的强制出境禁令和非法拘留而受到损害。

Approach 方针

The NSS demands that the United States “rethink the policies of the past two decades – policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false. Rival actors use propaganda and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western views and spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners.”

国家安全局要求美国“重新思考过去 20 年的政策——基于这样一种假设，即与竞争对手接触并将其纳入国际机构和全球贸易将使它们成为善意的行为者和值得信赖的伙伴。在大多数情况下，这个前提被证明是错误的。敌对的角色利用宣传和其他手段试图诋毁民主。他们鼓吹反西方观点，散布虚假信息，在我们自己、我们的盟友和我们的伙伴之间制造分歧。”

Guided by a return to principled realism, the United States is responding to the CCP's direct challenge by acknowledging that we are in a strategic competition and protecting our interests

appropriately. The principles of the United States' approach to China are articulated both in the NSS and our vision for the Indo-Pacific region – sovereignty, freedom, openness, rule of law, fairness, and reciprocity. United States-China relations do not determine our Indo-Pacific strategy, but rather fall within that strategy and the overarching NSS. By the same token, our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region does not exclude China.

在回归原则性现实主义的指导下，美国正在通过承认我们处于战略竞争和适当地保护我们的利益来回应中共的直接挑战。美国对华方针的原则在《国家安全战略》和我们对印太地区的愿景中都有阐述，即主权、自由、开放、法治、公平和互惠。中美关系并不决定我们的印度洋太平洋战略，而是属于这一战略和国家安全战略的总体框架。同样，我们建立自由开放的印度洋太平洋地区的愿景并不排斥中国。

The United States holds the PRC government to the same standards and principles that apply to all nations. We believe this is the treatment that the people of China want and deserve from their own government and from the international community. Given the strategic choices China's leadership is making, the United States now acknowledges and accepts the relationship with the PRC as the CCP has always framed it internally: one of great power competition.

美国认为，中华人民共和国政府应遵守适用于所有国家的同样标准和原则。我们相信，这是中国人民希望并理应从中国政府和国际社会得到的待遇。鉴于中国领导层正在做出的战略选择，美国现在承认并接受中共内部一直以来对中美关系的描述：大国竞争的关系。

United States policies are not premised on an attempt to change the PRC's domestic governance model, nor do they make concessions to the CCP's narratives of exceptionalism and victimhood. Rather, United States policies are designed to protect our interests and empower our institutions to withstand the CCP's malign behavior and collateral damage from the PRC's internal governance problems. Whether the PRC eventually converges with the principles of the free and open order can only be determined by the Chinese people themselves. We recognize that Beijing, not Washington, has agency over and responsibility for the PRC government's actions.

美国的政策并非以试图改变中华人民共和国国内治理模式为前提，但也不会对中共关于例外主义和受害者的叙述作出让步。相反，美国的政策是为了保护我们的利益，使我们的机构能够抵御中共的恶性行为和中华人民共和国内部治理问题带来的附带损害。中华人民共和国是否最终会与自由开放的秩序原则接轨，只能由中国人民自己决定。我们承认，北京，而不是华盛顿，对中华人民共和国政府的行为负有责任。

The United States rejects CCP attempts at false equivalency between rule-of-law and rule-by-law; between counterterrorism and oppression; between representative governance and autocracy; and between market-based competition and state-directed mercantilism. The United States will continue to challenge Beijing's propaganda and false narratives that distort the truth and attempt to demean American values and ideals.

美国反对中共企图在法治与法制、反恐与压迫、代议制与专制、市场竞争与国家主导的重商主义之间进行虚假等同。美国将继续挑战北京的宣传和歪曲事实真相、企图贬低美国价值观和理想的虚假言论。

Similarly, the United States does not and will not accommodate Beijing's actions that weaken a free, open, and rules-based international order. We will continue to refute the CCP's narrative that the United States is in strategic retreat or will shirk our international security commitments. The United States will work with our robust network of allies and likeminded partners to resist attacks on our shared norms and values, within our own governance institutions, around the world, and in international organizations.

同样，美国不会也不会迁就北京削弱自由、开放和基于规则的国际秩序的行动。我们将继续驳斥中共关于美国在战略上倒退或逃避我们的国际安全承诺的说法。美国将与我们强大的盟友和志同道合的伙伴网络合作，在我们自己的治理机构内、在世界各地以及在国际组织中抵制对我们共同规范和价值观的攻击。

The American people's generous contributions to China's development are a matter of historical record – just as the Chinese people's remarkable accomplishments in the era of Reform and Opening are undeniable. However, the negative trend lines of Beijing's policies and practices threaten the legacy of the Chinese people and their future position in the world.

美国人民为中国的发展做出的慷慨贡献是有史可查的--正如中国人民在改革开放时代取得的辉煌成就是不可否认的一样。但是，北京的政策和做法的负面趋势线，威胁到了中国人民的遗产和其未来在世界上的地位。

Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not offer compromises in response to American displays of goodwill, and that its actions are not constrained by its prior commitments to respect our interests. As such, the United States responds to the PRC's actions rather than its stated commitments. Moreover, we do not cater to Beijing's demands to create a proper "atmosphere" or "conditions" for dialogue.

北京一再表明，它不会对美国的善意表示妥协，其行动不受其先前承诺尊重我国利益的限制。因此，美国将回应的是中华人民共和国的行动，而不是其声明的承诺。此外，我们不再满足北京的要求，为对话创造适当的 "气氛 "或 "条件"。

Likewise, the United States sees no value in engaging with Beijing for symbolism and pageantry; we instead demand tangible results and constructive outcomes. We acknowledge and respond in kind to Beijing's transactional approach with timely incentives and costs, or credible threats thereof. When quiet diplomacy proves futile, the United States will increase public pressure on the PRC government and take action to protect United States interests by leveraging proportional costs when necessary.

同样，美国认为与北京的接触没有任何价值，只是为了象征性的、花哨的东西；我们要求的是切实的结果和建设性的结果。我们承认并以同样的方式回应北京的交易性做法，对其及时提供激励和成本，或做出可信的威胁。当平静的外交手段被证明是徒劳无益的时候，美国将加大对中华人民共和国政府的公众压力，并在必要的时候采取相应行动，利用成比例的成本来保护美国的利益。

The PRC government has fallen short of its commitments in many areas including: trade and investment; freedoms of expression and belief; political interference; freedoms of navigation and overflight; cyber and other types of espionage and theft; weapons proliferation; environmental protection; and global health. Agreements with Beijing must include stringent verification and enforcement mechanisms.

中华人民共和国政府在许多领域没有履行其承诺，包括：贸易和投资；言论和信仰自由；政治干预；航行和领空自由；网络和其他类型的间谍活动和盗窃；武器扩散；环境保护；以及全球健康。与北京的协议必须包括严格的核查和执行机制。

We speak candidly with the Chinese people and expect honesty from PRC leaders. In matters of diplomacy, the United States responds appropriately to the CCP's insincere or vague threats, and stands up alongside our allies and partners to resist coercion. Through our continuous and frank engagement, the United States welcomes cooperation by China to expand and work toward shared objectives in ways that benefit the peace, stability, and prosperity of the world. Our approach does not exclude the PRC. The United States stands ready to welcome China's positive contributions.

我们与中国人民坦诚相待，并期待中华人民共和国领导人坦诚相待。在外交问题上，美国对中共的不真诚或模糊的威胁作出适当的回应，并与我们的盟友和伙伴站在一起抵制胁迫。通过持续和坦诚的接触，美国欢迎中国以有利于世界和平、稳定和繁荣的方式扩大与美方的合作，努力实现共同目标。我们的做法并不排斥中华人民共和国。美国随时准备欢迎中国的积极贡献。

As the above tenets of our approach imply, competition necessarily includes engagement with the PRC, but our engagements are selective and results-oriented, with each advancing our national interests. We engage with the PRC to negotiate and enforce commitments to ensure fairness and reciprocity; clarify Beijing's intentions to avoid misunderstanding; and resolve disputes to prevent escalation. The United States is committed to maintaining open channels of communication with the PRC to reduce risks and manage crises. We expect the PRC to also keep these channels open and responsive.

正如上述原则所示，竞争必然包括与中华人民共和国的接触，但我们的接触是有选择性的、以结果为导向的，每一次接触都是为了促进我们的国家利益。我们与中华人民共和国的接触是为了谈判和履行承诺，以确保公平和互惠；明晰北京的意图，避免误解；解决争端，

防止争端升级。美国致力于与中华人民共和国保持开放的沟通渠道，以减少风险和管理危机。我们期望中方也能保持这些渠道的畅通和回应。

Implementation 实现

In accordance with the President's NSS, the political, economic, and security policies outlined in this report seek to protect the American people and homeland, promote American prosperity, preserve peace through strength, and advance a free and open vision abroad. During the first 3 years of the Administration, the United States has taken significant steps in implementing this strategy as it applies to China.

根据川普总统发布的《国家安全政策》，本报告中概述的有关政治，经济和安全的政策旨在保护美国人民及其家园，促进美国繁荣，通过力量维护和平，并在国外推进自由开放的愿景。在政府成立的头三年中，美国为实施适用于中国的这一战略采取了重要措施。

1. Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life

1. 保护美国人民及其家园和生活方式的安全

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ)'s China Initiative and Federal Bureau of Investigation are directing resources to identify and prosecute trade secrets theft, hacking, and economic espionage; and increasing efforts to protect against malign foreign investment in United States infrastructure, supply chain threats, and foreign agents seeking to influence American policy. For example, DOJ informed PRC state media company CGTN-America of its obligation to register as a foreign agent as specified under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which obligates registrants to disclose their activities to Federal authorities and appropriately label information materials they distribute. CGTN-America subsequently registered under FARA.

美国司法部（DOJ）的中国行动计划组和联邦调查局正在调配资源来识别和起诉包括商业机密盗窃，黑客入侵和经济间谍活动；并加大力度防止外国对美国基础设施的恶意投资，供应链威胁以及外国代理人寻求对美国政策的影响。例如，司法部通知中华人民共和国国家媒体 CGTN-America 根据《外国代理人登记法》的规定，其有义务登记为外国代理人。该法规定，登记人有义务向联邦政府部门披露其活动，并适当地对他们所发布的内容进行标注。随后，CGTN-America 根据《外国代理人登记法》的规定完成了登记。

The Administration is also responding to CCP propaganda in the United States by highlighting malign behavior, countering false narratives, and compelling transparency. United States officials, including those from the White House and the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, are leading efforts to educate the American public about the PRC government's exploitation of our free and open society to push a CCP agenda inimical to United States interests and values. In an effort to achieve reciprocity of access, the Department of State has implemented a policy requiring

Chinese diplomats to notify the United States Government before meeting with state and local government officials and academic institutions.

美国政府还针对中共部署在美国的大外宣做出了回应，包括公布其恶意行为，对其发布的虚假信息进行回击，并要求其保证信息透明。包括来自白宫、国务院、国防部和司法部的美国政府官员正在牵头对美国公众进行教育，包括关于中华人民共和国政府是如何通过破坏美国自由和开放的社会来推行与美国利益和价值观相违背的中共议程。国务院已经实施了一项政策，要求中国外交官在会见州和地方政府官员以及学术机构之前，必须通知美国政府。

The Administration is raising awareness of and actively combatting Beijing's co-optation and coercion of its own citizens and others in United States academic institutions, beyond traditional espionage and influence efforts. We are working with universities to protect the rights of Chinese students on American campuses, provide information to counter CCP propaganda and disinformation, and ensure an understanding of ethical codes of conduct in an American academic environment.

美国政府正在提高认知，积极打击北京除传统间谍和社会影响手段之外，伙同或者胁迫中国公民和其他在美学术机构工作人员的行为。我们正在与大学合作，以保护中国学生在美国校园的权利，提供信息共同对抗中共大外宣和虚假信息，并保障了美国学术环境中对道德行为准则的共识。

Chinese students represent the largest cohort of foreign students in the United States today. The United States values the contributions of Chinese students and researchers. As of 2019, the number of Chinese students and researchers in the United States has reached an all-time high, while the number of student visa denials to Chinese applicants has steadily declined. The United States strongly supports the principles of open academic discourse and welcomes international students and researchers conducting legitimate academic pursuits; we are improving processes to screen out the small minority of Chinese applicants who attempt to enter the United States under false pretenses or with malign intent.

中国学生是当今美国最大的外国学生群体。美国重视中国学生和研究人员贡献。截至2019年，美国的中国学生和研究人员数量已达到历史最高水平，而中国留学签证的拒签数量正在稳步下降。美国坚决支持学术公开讨论的原则，欢迎国际学生和研究人员进行合法的学术追求；我们正在改进程序，以期筛选出那些极少数的企图以虚假借口或不良意图进入美国的中国申请者。

In the United States research community, Federal agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and the Department of Energy have updated or clarified regulations and procedures to ensure compliance with applicable standards of conduct and reporting, in order to improve transparency and prevent conflicts of interest. The National Science and Technology Council's Joint Committee on the Research Environment is developing standards for Federally-funded research, and best

practices for United States research institutions. The Department of Defense is working to ensure grantees do not also have contracts with China's talent recruitment programs, while also continuing to welcome foreign researchers.

在美国研究界，为了提高透明度和防止利益冲突，包括美国国立卫生研究院(NIH)和能源部在内的联邦机构，已经更新或澄清了条例和程序以确保遵守适用的行为标准和报告标准。国家环境研究科学与技术联合委员会正在制定相关标准，关于联邦政府资助的研究项目和美国研究机构的最佳实践。国防部正在研究如何确保受赠人不会与中国的千人、百人计划等人才招募计划有任何联系，同时也继续欢迎外国研究人员加入。

To prevent foreign malign actors from gaining access to United States information networks, the President issued the “Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain” and the “Executive Order on Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector.” The implementation of these Executive Orders will prevent certain companies associated with or answering to the intelligence and security apparatus of foreign adversaries from, for example, readily accessing the private and sensitive information of the United States Government, the United States private sector, and individual Americans. To ensure protection of our information worldwide, including sensitive military and intelligence data, the United States is actively engaging with our allies and partners, including in multilateral fora, to promote a set of common standards for secure, resilient, and trusted communications platforms that underpin the global information economy. To compel Beijing to adhere to norms of responsible state behavior, the United States is working with allies and like-minded partners to attribute and otherwise deter malicious cyber activities.

为了防止外国恶性行为者进入美国的信息网络，总统发布了《保护信息和通信技术和供应链安全的行政命令》和《设立评估外国参与美国电信服务业委员会的行政命令》。这些行政命令的执行，将防止某些与外国敌对势力的情报和安全机构有联系或听命于他们的公司获取敏感信息，例如，防止它们轻易地接触到美国政府、美国私营企业和美国公民的隐私的和敏感的信息。为了确保我们的信息在全球范围内得到保护，包括敏感的军事和情报数据，美国正在积极与我们的盟国和合作伙伴进行接触，包括在多边论坛上推广一套共同的安全、弹性和值得信赖的通信平台，为全球信息经济的发展奠定基础。为迫使中共政府遵守负责任的国家行为规范，美国正在与盟国和志同道合的伙伴合作，以定位和遏制恶意网络活动。

The Administration is implementing the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act to update and strengthen the capacity of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to address growing national security concerns over foreign exploitation of investment structures, which previously fell outside CFIUS jurisdiction. This includes preventing Chinese companies from exploiting access to United States innovation through minority investments in order to modernize the Chinese military. The United States has updated its export control regulations, particularly in light of Beijing's whole-of-society MCF strategy and its efforts to acquire advanced technologies related to hypersonics, quantum computing, artificial intelligence,

biotechnology, and other emerging and foundational technologies. We are also engaging allies and partners to develop their own foreign investment screening mechanisms, and to update and implement export controls collaboratively through multilateral regimes and other forums.

政府正在实施《外国投资风险审查现代化法案》，以更新和加强在“美外国投资委员会投资委员会”（CFIUS）的能力，以解决外国投资者滥用投资结构导致的日益增长的国家安全担忧，以前不属于“美国外国投资委员会”的管辖范围。这包括防止中国企业通过少量投资进入美国的科技创新领域，并将其用于增强中国军队的实力。美国更新了出口管制条例，特别是鉴于北京的基于全社会的军民融合战略及其努力在获取高超音速技术、量子计算、人工智能、生物技术和其他新兴和基础技术。我们还让盟友和伙伴开发他们自己的外国投资审查机制，并对多边政权和其他论坛更新和实施出口管制。

The United States Government is also taking concrete actions to protect the American consumer from counterfeit and substandard products. Between 2017 and 2018, the United States Department of Homeland Security seized more than 59,000 shipments of counterfeit goods, produced in the PRC, valued at more than \$2.1 billion. This represents five times the total shipments and value seized from all other foreign countries combined.

美国政府也在采取切实行动，保护美国消费者免受假冒伪劣产品的侵害。在 2017 年至 2018 年期间，美国国土安全部查获了 5.9 万多批在中国生产的假冒伪劣商品，价值超过 21 亿美元。这相当于从其他所有外国国家查获的货物总数和价值的 5 倍。

In addition to falsely branded apparel, footwear, handbags, and watches, United States Customs and Border Protection intercepted three shipments containing 53,000 illegal Chinese gun parts and electronics that could have compromised the security and privacy of American businesses and consumers. United States law enforcement agencies are also targeting counterfeit pharmaceuticals and cosmetics originating from China, which have been found to contain high levels of contaminants, including bacteria and animal waste that pose a danger to American consumers.

除了假冒品牌的服装、鞋类、手袋和手表外，美国海关和边境保护局截获了可能会危及美国企业和消费者的安全和隐私的，三批载有 53000 个非法的中国的枪支零部件和电子产品。美国的执法机构也在对原产于中国的假药和化妆品做筛查，这些药品和化妆品被发现含有大量的污染物，包括细菌和动物排泄物，这些都对美国消费者构成威胁。

The United States is working with Chinese authorities to stem the deadly flow of illicit Chinese fentanyl from the PRC to the United States. In December 2018, the President secured a commitment from his Chinese counterpart to control all forms of fentanyl in the PRC. With the Chinese regulatory regime in place since May 2019, United States and PRC law enforcement agencies are sharing intelligence and coordinating to set conditions for enforcement actions that will deter Chinese drug producers and traffickers. The United States is also working with China's postal agencies to improve tracking of small parcels for law enforcement purposes.

美国正在与中国当局合作，以阻止致命的芬太尼被非法的从中华人民共和国运往美国。2018 年 12 月，习近平主席向川普总统承诺在中国管制一切形式的芬太尼。随着 2019 年 5 月到位的中国监管制度，美国和中华人民共和国执法部门将通过共享情报，协调配合的

执法行动来震慑中国毒品生产者和贩毒者。美国还与中国的邮政机构合作，加强对小型包裹进行以执法为目的的检测。

2. Promote American Prosperity

2. 促进美国的繁荣

In response to the PRC's documented unfair and abusive trade practices and industrial policies, the Administration is taking strong actions to protect American businesses, workers, and farmers, and to put an end to Beijing's practices that have contributed to a hollowing-out of the United States manufacturing base. The United States is committed to rebalancing the United States-China economic relationship. Our whole-of-government approach supports fair trade and advances United States competitiveness, promotes United States exports, and breaks down unjust barriers to United States trade and investment. Having failed since 2003 to persuade Beijing to adhere to its economic commitments through regular, high-level dialogues, the United States is confronting China's market-distorting forced technology transfer and intellectual property practices by imposing costs in the form of tariffs levied on Chinese goods coming into the United States. Those tariffs will remain in place until a fair Phase Two trade deal is agreed to by the United States and the PRC.

针对中华人民共和国记录在案的不公平和虐待性贸易做法和工业政策，美国政府正在采取强有力的行动，来保护美国的企业、工人和农民，并结束了北京的做法，因为这些做法导致了美国制造业的空心化。美国致力于重新平衡中美经济关系。我们的全政府的做法支持公平贸易，提高美国的竞争力，促进美国的出口，并打破对美国贸易的不公正壁垒和投资。美国自 2003 年以来一直尝试通过定期的高级别对话，希望但未能说服北京遵守其经济发展战略。美国对于中国的扭曲市场的强迫技术转让和知识产权的做法，采取了对进入美国的中国商品征收关税的形式以提高其成本。这些关税将继续实施，直到美国和中华人民共和国达成公平的第二阶段贸易协议。

In response to Beijing's repeated failure to reduce or eliminate its market-distorting subsidies and overcapacity, the United States imposed tariffs to protect our strategically important steel and aluminum industries. For those unfair Chinese trade practices that are subject to dispute settlement at the WTO, the United States continues to pursue and win multiple cases. Finally, to crack down on China's dumping and subsidies across a broad range of industries, the Department of Commerce is making greater utility of United States antidumping and countervailing duties laws than in past administrations.

针对北京一直以来的不减少或取消其扭曲市场的补贴和过剩的产能，美国征收关税以保护我国具有重要战略意义的钢铁行业和铝业。对于那些需要在 WTO 进行争端解决的中国不公平贸易行为，美国继续进行诉讼并在多个案件中获胜。最后，为了打击中国在众多行业中的倾销和补贴，美国商务部正在实施比往届政府都更大力度的反倾销税和反补贴税法。

In January 2020, the United States and the PRC signed Phase One of an economic and trade agreement that requires structural reforms and other changes to China's economic and trade regime, addressing several longstanding United States concerns. The agreement prohibits the PRC from forcing or pressuring foreign companies to transfer their technology as a condition for doing business in China; strengthens protection and enforcement of intellectual property in China in all key areas; creates new market opportunities in China for United States agriculture and financial services by addressing policy barriers; and addresses longstanding, unfair currency practices. The agreement also establishes a strong dispute resolution mechanism that ensures prompt and effective implementation and enforcement. By addressing structural barriers to trade and making the commitments fully enforceable, the Phase One agreement will expand United States exports to China. As part of this agreement, the PRC committed over the next 2 years to increase imports of United States goods and services by no less than \$200 billion in four broad categories: manufactured goods, agriculture, energy, and services. This agreement marks critical progress toward a more balanced trade relationship and a more level playing field for American workers and companies.

2020年1月，美国和中华人民共和国签署了第一阶段经贸协议，要求对中国的经贸体制进行结构性改革和其他方面的改革，解决美国长期以来的几项关切。该协议禁止中华人民共和国强迫或迫使外国公司转让其技术作为在中国开展业务的条件；在所有关键领域加强对中国知识产权的保护和执行；通过解决政策壁垒，为美国农业和金融服务在中国创造新的市场机会；解决长期以来不公平的汇率问题。该协议还建立了强有力的争端解决机制，确保迅速有效地实施和执行。通过解决结构性贸易壁垒并使承诺完全可执行，第一阶段协议将扩大美国对中国的出口。作为该协议的一部分，中华人民共和国承诺在未来两年内将在四大类商品、制造业商品、农产品、能源和服务业中增加不少于 2000 亿美元的进口。该协议对美国工人和企业意味着一个更平衡的贸易关系和一个更公平的竞争环境。

Domestically, the Administration is taking steps to strengthen the United States economy and promote economic sectors of the future, such as 5G technology, through tax reforms and a robust deregulatory agenda. The President's "Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence" is an example of a United States Government initiative to promote investment and collaboration to ensure the United States continues to lead in innovation and setting standards for a growing industry.

美国政府在国内正在采取措施加强经济，并推行面向未来的经济，比如通过税制改革和强有力的放松管制议程，来促进 5G 技术的发展。川普总统的 "关于维持美国在人工智能领域领导地位的行政命令" 是一个美国政府发起的，以确保美国继续在高速发展的行业中得以领导创新和制定标准的例证。

Together with other likeminded nations, the United States promotes an economic vision based on principles of sovereignty, free markets, and sustainable development. Alongside the European Union and Japan, the United States is engaged in a robust trilateral process to develop disciplines

for state-owned enterprises, industrial subsidies, and forced technology transfers. We will also continue to work with our allies and partners to ensure that discriminatory industrial standards do not become global standards. As the world's most valuable consumer market, largest source of foreign direct investment, and leading wellspring of global technological innovation, the United States engages extensively with allies and partners to evaluate shared challenges and coordinate effective responses to ensure continued peace and prosperity. We work closely with United States companies to build their competitiveness at home and abroad while fostering sustainable development through programs such as Prosper Africa, *America Crece* in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy in the Indo-Pacific region.

美国与其他志同道合的国家一道，促进以主权、自由市场和可持续发展原则为基础的经济愿景。美国正与欧洲联盟和日本一道，参与一个强有力的三边进程，为国有企业、工业补贴和强迫技术转让制定原则。我们还将继续与我们的盟友和伙伴合作，确保歧视性的工业标准不会成为全球标准。作为世界上最有价值的消费市场、最大的外国直接投资来源和全球技术创新的主要源泉，美国与盟国和伙伴广泛接触，评估共同的挑战，协调有效的应对措施，以确保持续的和平与繁荣。我们与美国公司紧密合作，在促进可持续发展的同时，建立其在国内外的竞争力，通过诸如“非洲繁荣”、“拉丁美洲和加勒比地区的美洲克雷斯”和通过能源促进印度洋太平洋区域的发展和增长。

3. Preserve Peace through Strength

3. 通过力量维护和平

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) prioritizes long-term competition with China and emphasizes modernization and partnerships to counter the PLA's technological advancements, force development, and growing international presence and assertiveness. As described in the Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration is prioritizing the modernization of the nuclear triad, including the development of supplementary capabilities designed to deter Beijing from using its weapons of mass destruction or conducting other strategic attacks. Meanwhile, the United States continues to urge China's leaders to come to the table and begin arms control and strategic risk reduction discussions as a nuclear power with a modern and growing nuclear arsenal and the world's largest collection of intermediate range delivery systems. The United States believes it is in the interest of all nations to improve Beijing's transparency, prevent miscalculations, and avoid costly arms buildups.

2018 年的《国防战略》提高了中国的长期竞争的优先级，强调通过现代化和合作伙伴对抗中国人民解放军的技术进步、力量发展以及日益增长的国际存在和攻击性。正如《核态势评估报告》中所描述的那样，美国政府正在将核海陆空核武器的现代化作为优先事项，包括发展旨在阻止北京使用其大规模杀伤性武器或进行其他战略攻击的备用能力。同时，由于中国正在成为一个拥有现代化的、不断增长的核武库和世界上最大的中程导弹系统的核大国，美国敦促中国领导人走到谈判桌前，开始讨论军备控制和减少战略风险。美国认为，提高北京的透明度，防止误判，避免代价高昂的军备开支，符合所有国家的利益。

The Department of Defense is moving quickly to deploy hypersonic platforms, increasing investments in cyber and space capabilities, and developing more lethal fires based on resilient, adaptive, and cost-effective platforms. Together, these capabilities are intended to deter and counter Beijing's growing ambitions and the PLA's drive toward technological parity and superiority.

国防部正在迅速部署高超音速系统，增加对网络安全和太空能力的投资，并在弹性、可适应和性价比高的平台基础上开发更多的致命武器。这些能力加在一起，目的在于遏制和对抗北京日益增长的野心和解放军对科技平等和优势的追求。

As part of our worldwide freedom of navigation operations program, the United States is pushing back on Beijing's hegemonic assertions and excessive claims. The United States military will continue to exercise the right to navigate and operate wherever international law allows, including in the South China Sea. We are speaking up for regional allies and partners, and providing security assistance to help them build capacity to withstand Beijing's attempts to use its military, paramilitary, and law enforcement forces to coerce and prevail in disputes. In 2018, the United States military withdrew the invitation for the PLA to participate in the biennial Rim of the Pacific exercise due to Beijing's deployment of advanced missile systems onto manmade features in the South China Sea.

作为我们全球自由导航行动方案的一部分，美国正在回击北京的霸权主义和过度主张。美军将继续在国际法允许的地方，包括在南中国海，行使航行权和行动权。我们正在为地区盟友和伙伴发声，并提供安全援助，帮助他们建立能力，抵御北京利用其军事、准军事和执法力量胁迫和在争端中取得胜利的企图。2018年，由于北京在南中国海的人工岛上部署了先进的导弹系统，美国军方取消了对中国人民解放军参加两年一度的环太平洋军事演习的邀请。

Stronger alliances and partnerships are a cornerstone of the NDS. The United States is building partner capacity and deepening interoperability to develop a combat-credible forward operating presence, fully integrated with allies and partners to deter and deny PRC aggression. The Administration's Conventional Arms Transfer policy aims to promote United States arms sales and accelerate the transformation of partner military capabilities in a strategic and complementary manner. In June 2019, the Department of Defense released its first Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, articulating the Department's implementation of the NDS and our whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.

更强的联盟和伙伴关系是国防战略的基石。美国正在建设合作伙伴的能力，深化互通性，以发展一支战斗力强的前方作战力量，并与盟国和伙伴充分融合，以遏制和抵御中华人民共和国的侵略。政府的常规武器转让政策旨在以战略互补的方式促进美国的武器销售和加快合作伙伴军事能力的转型。2019年6月，美国国防部发布了首份《印太战略报告》，明确阐述了国防部实施的国防战略的实施情况以及我们对整个印太地区的整体政府战略。

The United States will continue to maintain strong unofficial relations with Taiwan in accordance with our “One China” policy, based on the Taiwan Relations Act and the three United States-PRC Joint Communiques. The United States maintains that any resolution of cross-Straits differences must be peaceful and according to the will of the people on both sides, without resorting to threat or coercion. Beijing’s failure to honor its commitments under the communiques, as demonstrated by its massive military build-up, compels the United States to continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible self-defense, which deters aggression and helps to ensure peace and stability in the region. In a 1982 memorandum, President Ronald Reagan insisted “that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.” In 2019, the United States approved more than \$10 billion of arms sales to Taiwan.

根据《台湾关系法》和美中两国的三个《中美联合公报》，美国将在现有的“一个中国”政策下，继续与台湾保持强有力的非官方关系。美国主张，任何两岸分歧的解决都必须是和平的，符合两岸人民的意愿，而不是诉诸威胁或胁迫。北京不履行其在公约中的承诺，体现在其大规模的军事建设中，这迫使美国继续协助台湾军方维持一个可靠的自卫（可信的自卫），以遏制侵略，并有助于确保该地区的和平与稳定。在1982年的一份备忘录中，罗纳德-里根总统坚称，“提供给台湾的武器数量和质量应完全取决于中华人民共和国所构成的威胁”。2019年，美国批准了超过100亿美元对台军售。

The United States remains committed to maintaining a constructive, results-oriented relationship with the PRC. The United States conducts defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC to communicate strategic intent; prevent and manage crises; reduce the risks of miscalculation and misunderstanding that could escalate into conflict; and cooperate in areas of shared interest. The United States military engages with the PLA to develop effective crisis communication mechanisms, including responsive channels for de-escalation in unplanned scenarios.

美国仍然致力于与中华人民共和国保持建设性的、注重成果的关系。美国与中华人民共和国进行国防接触和交流，以传达战略意图；预防和管理危机；减少可能升级为冲突的误判和误解的风险；并在共同关心的领域进行合作。美国军方与中国人民解放军合作，建立有效的危机沟通机制，其中包括在意外情况下减少冲突的反应渠道。

4. Advance American Influence

4. 提升美国的影响力

For the past seven decades, the free and open international order has provided the stability to allow sovereign, independent states to flourish and contribute to unprecedented global economic growth. As a large, developed country and a major beneficiary of this order, the PRC should help guarantee freedom and openness for other nations around the globe. When Beijing instead promotes or abets authoritarianism, self-censorship, corruption, mercantilist economics, and intolerance of ethnic and religious diversity, the United States leads international efforts to resist and counter these malign activities.

在过去70年中，自由开放的国际秩序为主权独立国家的繁荣发展提供了保证，为全球经济的空前增长做出了贡献。作为一个发达的大国和这一秩序的主要受益者，中华人民共和国应该帮助保障全球其他国家的自由和开放。当北京反而提倡或教唆专制主义、自我审查、

腐败、重商主义经济、不容忍民族和宗教多样性时，美国就应该引导国际社会努力抵制和打击这些恶性活动。

In 2018 and 2019, the Secretary of State hosted the first two gatherings of the Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom. Along with the President's unprecedented Global Call to Protect Religious Freedom during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2019, these events brought together global leaders to address religious persecution around the world. During both ministerials, the United States and partner countries released joint statements calling on the PRC government to respect the rights of Uighur and other Turkic Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and Falun Gong adherents, all of whom face repression and persecution in China. In February 2020, the Department of State launched the first ever International Religious Freedom Alliance with 25 likeminded partners to defend the right of every person to worship without fear. The President met with Chinese dissidents and survivors on the margins of the 2019 Ministerial, and he shared the stage during UNGA with victims of religious persecution from China. The United States also continues to support human rights defenders and independent civil society working in or on China.

在 2018 年和 2019 年，美国国务卿主办了前两次促进宗教自由的部长级会议。这些活动与总统在 2019 年 9 月联合国大会期间发出的前所未有的全球保护宗教自由呼吁一起，使全球领导人齐聚一堂，共同应对世界各地的宗教迫害问题。在这两次部长级会议期间，美国和其他伙伴国家发表联合声明，呼吁中华人民共和国政府尊重维吾尔族和其他突厥族穆斯林、藏传佛教徒、基督教徒和法轮功信徒的权利，这些人在中国都面临着镇压和迫害。2020 年 2 月，美国国务院与 25 个志同道合的伙伴共同发起成立了有史以来第一个国际宗教自由联盟，以捍卫每个人没有恐惧的信仰权利。在 2019 年部长级会议期间，美国总统与中国异议人士和幸存者会面，并在联合国大会期间与来自中国的宗教迫害受害者同台。美国还将继续支持在中国境内（工作）或在中国（问题上）工作的人权斗士和独立民间社会人士。

In October 2019 at the United Nations in New York, the United States joined likeminded nations in condemning Beijing's ongoing human rights violations and other repressive policies in Xinjiang that threaten international peace and security. The latter event followed United States Government actions to stop United States exports to select Chinese government agencies and surveillance technology companies complicit in the Xinjiang human rights abuses and to deny United States visas for Chinese officials, and their family members, responsible for violating Beijing's international human rights commitments. The United States has also begun actions to block imports of Chinese goods produced using forced labor in Xinjiang.

2019 年 10 月，在纽约联合国总部大楼，美国与志同道合的国家一起谴责北京在新疆持续侵犯人权和其他威胁国际和平与安全的镇压政策。在那之后，美国政府采取行动，禁止美国向侵犯新疆人权的中国政府机构以及监控科技公司出口商品，并拒绝向对违反北京国际人权承诺的中国官员及其家属发放美国签证。与此同时，美国还开始采取行动，阻止进口在新疆使用强迫劳动生产的中国商品。

The United States will continue to take a principled stand against the use of our technology to support China's military and its technology-enabled authoritarianism, working in conjunction with likeminded allies and partners. In doing so, we will implement policies that keep pace with rapid technological change and PRC efforts to blend civil and military uses and compel companies to support China's security and intelligence services.

美国将与志同道合的盟国和伙伴合作，继续采取原则立场，反对使用我们的技术来支持中国的军事及其科技化专制主义。在此过程中，我们将紧跟中华人民共和国的迅速科技变革和致力于军民融合的步伐，利用和迫使外国公司支持中国安全和情报服务。

These efforts demonstrate United States commitment to the fundamental values and norms that have served as the foundation of the international system since the end of the Second World War. While the United States has no desire to interfere in the PRC's internal affairs, Washington will continue to be candid when Beijing strays from its international commitments and responsible behavior, especially when United States interests are at stake. For example, the United States has significant interests in the future of Hong Kong. Approximately 85,000 United States citizens and more than 1,300 United States businesses reside in Hong Kong. The President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State have repeatedly called on Beijing to honor the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and preserve Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, rule of law, and democratic freedoms, which enable Hong Kong to remain a successful hub of international business and finance.

这些努力显示出美国对第二次世界大战结束以来作为国际体系基础的基本价值观和准则的承诺。虽然美国无意干预中华人民共和国内政，但当北京偏离其国际承诺和负责任的行为时，尤其是当美国的利益受到威胁时，华盛顿会继续直言不讳的指出。例如，美国对香港的未来十分关心。大约有 85,000 名美国公民和 1300 多家美国企业长期在香港。美国总统、副总统和国务卿多次呼吁北京尊重 1984 年的《中英联合声明》，维护香港的高度自治、法治和民主自由，使香港继续作为国际商业和金融中心。

The United States is expanding its role as an Indo-Pacific nation that promotes free enterprise and democratic governance. In November 2019, the United States, Japan, and Australia launched the Blue Dot Network to promote transparently-financed, high quality infrastructure through private sector led development around the world, which will add to the nearly 1 trillion dollars of United States direct investment in the Indo-Pacific region alone. At the same time, the Department of State issued a detailed progress report on the implementation of our whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision.

美国正在扩大其作为促进自由企业和民主治理的印太国家的作用。2019 年 11 月，美国、日本和澳大利亚共同发起了 "蓝点网络"，通过私营部门主导的全球发展，来推动资金透明、高质量的基础设施建设，仅在印太地区就将增加近 1 万亿美元的美国直接投资。与此同时，美国国务院发布了一份关于实施我们印太地区整体政府战略详细进展的报告：《一个自由开放的印太：推进共同愿景》

Conclusion

结论

The Administration's approach to the PRC reflects a fundamental reevaluation of how the United States understands and responds to the leaders of the world's most populous country and second largest national economy. The United States recognizes the long-term strategic competition between our two systems. Through a whole-of-government approach and guided by a return to principled realism, as articulated by the NSS, the United States Government will continue to protect American interests and advance American influence. At the same time, we remain open to constructive, results-oriented engagement and cooperation from China where our interests align. We continue to engage with PRC leaders in a respectful yet clear-eyed manner, challenging Beijing to uphold its commitments.

美国政府对于中华人民共和国的态度，反映了美国对于如何理解和回应这个世界上人口最多的国家和第二大经济体的领导人的看法进行了根本性的重新评估。美国认识到我们两个体系之间的长期战略竞争。美国政府将通过采取整体政府的方式，在国家安全局所阐述的回归原则性现实主义的指导下，继续保护美国的利益，提升美国的影响力。同时，我们仍然愿意接受中国与我们在利益一致的情况下进行建设性的、注重成果的接触与合作。我们将继续以尊重而又清醒的方式与中华人民共和国领导人进行接触，要求北京履行其承诺。

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翻译: 【Ying202064】 【Nami(文花开)】 【小绵羊】 【小兔子爱吃糖】

校对: 【Winston Jackson】 【Jennifer】 【Naomi (文花开)】 【文青】

审核: 【GM31】 【Winston Jackson】